6. The learned single judge of the Delhi High Court, after hearing the parties, dismissed the application on the ground that there was already an injunction in the special benefits action of 04.11.1991 which prevented the defendant-Sawhneys from transferring or selling the plaintiff`s property, the alleged deeds of sale executed by the defendants in favour of the appellant, breached the respondents` undertaking, which is of the nature of the injunction. Saddened by this decision, the complainant appealed against FAO No. 295 of 2008, which was heard by a departmental court. The Judicial Division upheld the Single Judge`s decision and noted that, given the injunction issued by the respondents – Sawhneys – and recorded in the proceedings in the form of an undertaking as to how the property could be acquired by the appellants in 2008. The complainant, aggrieved by the above-mentioned orders, made this request for special leave. 15. In Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra alias Gadasa Guru (1995) 3 SCC 147, in a specific contract enforcement action, a motion under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC was filed to vary the action by filing the defendant as a defendant in the action. The applicant alleged that the seller had worked with his sons and his wife and had received a collusive decree in a legal action brought under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Agrarian Reform Act. It was argued that, as of right, they had become co-owners of the property to be transferred under the Agreement and were therefore a necessary party.

The Trial Court rejected the petition and the Allahabad Supreme Court upheld the order. In an appeal, this court refused to interfere with the order and observed. 12. It is also common ground that, before the action was brought, the defendant received a communication published on 12.02.1990 in the Hindustan Times newspaper, Delhi Edition. When the appellant became aware of it, the appellant`s sister company, M/s. Living Media India Limited, sent a legal notice dated 24.06.1990 to Sawhneys` defendants and asked him to sign the lease deed relating to the immovable property within the meaning of the agreement. In the above-mentioned communication of 24.06.1990, the applicant`s sister company stated in paragraph 8 that: 8.M. Gupta vigorously argued that the High Court had failed to consider whether the plaintiff-buyer was aware of the injunction of 04.11.1991 before the commencement of the sale in 2001. Even if Sawhneys had such knowledge, this cannot be considered an objection to the exercise of judicial discretion in favour of the appellant`s participation in the action at the request of the appellant himself. The defendant filed its immediate application under Article 3211 of the CPLR, which provides that a plea cannot be upheld if the Fraud Act is not complied with. The New York General Obligations Act § 5-703 states that a real estate contract “is void unless the contract or a note or memorandum thereof expressing consideration is in writing, signed by the party to be invoiced … ».

As the defendant points out and the plaintiff does not dispute, a long-term contract for the sale of the premises was never concluded. However, notwithstanding the wording of the binder that reflects such an intention, a short document or memorandum providing for a more formal agreement at a later date may still be sufficient to create a contractual obligation under New York law if it contains all the essential substantive terms of the agreement. In other words, the absence of execution of a more formal letter does not in itself affect the effectiveness of such a document. In the context of the defendant`s application for rejection, it is therefore first and foremost a question of whether the file contains all the essential elements of the parties` agreement and demonstrates their intention to be bound by its conditions. After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that, prima facie, the binder was not legally enforceable as a contract, since it was simply an agreement that had to be agreed at a later date. The phrase “otherwise treated” in part two of article 52 will cover the purchase contract, the three judges concluded. The court stated: “The phrase `otherwise dealt with by a party` has a very broad meaning, and any act or manner of dealing with the subject matter of the action in the course of the action or proceedings in progress that would affect the rights of another party to it, according to a decree or order that could possibly be issued in the action, falls within that expression ….